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Abstract
In September 2018, Xi Jinping announced that BRI financing will not be spent on vanity projects.
Despite and prior to this proclamation, using the AidData data set, I uncovered a vanity project
phenomenon in Chinese development financing. Chinese financed vanity projects, or development
projects that do not aid a country’s development needs, are present in 79 countries across the world,
ranging from sports stadiums in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to community centers in
the Pacific islands. In this thesis, I find that vanity projects are most likely to occur in fragile states
with strong international political cooperation with China. This indicates that China uses these
projects as a reward to its allies and to influence fragile states to continue cooperating with China.
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1. Introduction
On September 7th, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping completely changed how development
finance is conceptualized and operationalized with his announcement of the Silk Road Economic
Belt, now known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or One Belt One Road (OBOR), at a speech
in Kazakhstan.1 To some, this was a continuation of China’s 1999 “going out” or “going global”
strategy which sought to increase the international capabilities and competitiveness of domestic
firms, a strategy positively impacted by China joining the World Trade Organization in 2001.2 But
to most, the BRI represented a huge change.
According to the Chinese government, the BRI seeks to create a global community of
responsibility, shared interests, and destiny through the promotion of political trust, economic
integration, and cultural inclusiveness.3 The BRI, a primarily infrastructure investment initiative,
strives to stimulate economic growth through connective infrastructure along global trade routes,
assuming that these activities will have positive spillover effects for nearby sectors and local
communities.4 The essence of BRI ideology is that through integrated economic development, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC, China) can promote a peaceful, cooperative international

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk
Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries,” Belt and Road Portal, September 7, 2013,
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/hyygd/1849.htm.
Muyang Chen, “Official Aid or Export Credit: China’s Policy Banks and the Reshaping of Development Finance,”
GCI Working Paper (Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center Global China Initiative, June 2018),
http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/07/GCI-Muyang-Chen-2018.pdf.
2
Nargiza Salidjanova, “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment” (US-China
Economic & Security Review Commission, March 30, 2011),
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/GoingOut.pdf.
3
Government of China’s Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, “Special the Belt
and Road: The Silk Road Economic Belt + the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” Belt and Road Portal, accessed
April 26, 2022, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ztindex.htm.
4
Richard Bluhm et al., “Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic
Activity in Developing Countries,” Working Paper (AidData at William & Mary, August 2020),
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS103_Connective_Financing__Chinese_Infrastructure_Projects_and_the_Diffusi
on_of_Economic_Activity_in_Developing_Countries.pdf.
1
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community and increase living standards of local communities participating in BRI activities.5
However, there is a growing body of empirical data and academic literature debating whether the
BRI fulfills these stated positive impacts, or is primarily harmful to the recipient country. 6
Regardless of international opinion, the BRI has continually grown in both the size of its
investments and international recognition. In March 2017, a United Nations (UN) Security Council
resolution recognized the role of the BRI in strengthening regional economic cooperation. 7 As of
2021, 139 countries in the world have formally joined the initiative and official Chinese banks
have pledged over one trillion USD.8 This growth is expected to continue, as the official
incorporation of the BRI into the Chinese constitution in October 2017 signaled that this is a longterm initiative.9 At the same time, Xi Jinping formally expanded the scope of the BRI, announcing
that the BRI would be green, healthy, intelligent, and peaceful; in other words, the BRI would
prioritize environmental protection, the development of public health resources, human capital
initiatives, and security agreements. 10
The BRI’s seemingly unstoppable growth has prompted a wide body of literature
attempting to understand the strategy underlying the initiative, or if there is an even a strategy

OECD, “The Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape,” in OECD Business
and Finance Outlook 2018, by OECD, OECD Business and Finance Outlook (OECD, 2018), 61–101,
https://doi.org/10.1787/bus_fin_out-2018-6-en.
6
Kristen A. Cordell, “The Evolving Relationship between the International Development Architecture and China’s
Belt and Road,” Brookings, October 12, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-evolving-relationshipbetween-the-international-development-architecture-and-chinas-belt-and-road/.
7
“Chinese Landmark Concept Put into UN Security Council Resolution,” Belt and Road Portal, March 18, 2017,
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/9704.htm.
8
David Sacks, “Countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Who’s In And Who’s Out,” Council on Foreign
Relations, March 24, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/countries-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-whos-and-whos-out.
China Power Team, “How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s Interests?” Center for Strategic and
International Studies’ China Power Initiative, August 26, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-roadinitiative/.
9
Xinhua, “‘Belt and Road’ Incorporated into CPC Constitution,” October 24, 2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702025.htm.
10
Belt and Road Portal, "Special the Belt and Road: The Silk Road Economic Belt + the 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road."
5
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underlining the initiative. Academic and policy literature has focused on the BRI’s impacts on
human and economic development, investigating topics like the role of Confucius Institutes as a
tool of soft power and transportation infrastructure to reduce economic inequality. 11
In September 2021, the AidData research lab at William & Mary released the AidData’s
Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0, a data set that includes over 13,000
Chinese development financed projects across 145 countries from 2000 to 2017. In reviewing this
comprehensive data set, I noticed a phenomenon missing in BRI literature: Chinese-funded
projects that are not explicitly intended to offer economic or welfare benefits. These projects,
which provide few development benefits, have been overlooked by scholars and raise questions
about their purpose. Why did China build a civic center in Fiji? An opera and ballet theater in
Kyrgyzstan? Six football stadiums in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
This thesis investigates this phenomenon, coined “vanity projects,” and attempts to uncover
China’s motivation to fund non-welfare-based and non-economic based projects. Utilizing a mixed
methods approach, I first conduct a large-N quantitative analysis of fourteen independent variables
for all 145 countries in the original AidData data set, then perform a geospatial analysis of the
identified vanity projects at a sub-national level and carry out of a qualitative analysis of selected
cases.
I found that vanity projects are most likely to occur in fragile states with strong
international political cooperation with China. These states consistently vote with China at the UN
General Assembly, receive more Chinese financed projects, and have strong civil liberties.

Samuel Brazys and Alexander Dukalskis, “Grassroots Image Management: Confucius Institutes and Media
Perceptions of China,” Working Paper (AidData at William & Mary, January 10, 2019),
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS69_Grassroots_Image_Management.pdf.
Bluhm et al., “Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in
Developing Countries.”
11
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However, there is difference between politically fragile states and cases of state failure—defined
as successful or attempted regime changes—as the latter is less likely to receive vanity projects.
Notably, there is no singular reason explaining the vanity project phenomenon, an expected finding
considering the diversity of states in the data set and the high number of different Chinese financing
entities involved.

2. Literature Review
In September 2018, Xi Jinping announced that BRI financing is “not to be spent on any
vanity projects but in places where they count the most.”12 However, many academic articles have
observed that Beijing does fund vanity projects. In a 2021 analysis of the BRI in Uganda, Ogwang
and Vanclay wrote “many projects funded by these arrangements are vanity projects that are not
consistent with the country’s real development needs.”13 A 2020 analysis of the BRI as a tool of
diplomacy reported that “China’s politically directed investments resulted in vanity projects.”14
Each of these articles have something in common: the concept of vanity projects is noted but never
studied systematically.15
Chinese vanity projects are projects for an intended entity’s benefit, but scholars have used
other terms to describe these investments. A 2018 analysis of the United Kingdom labels vanity
projects as “extravagant pet projects” pursued by the prime minister for “hubris”—projects that

“China’s Xi Says Funds for Africa Not for ‘Vanity Projects,’” Reuters, September 3, 2018, sec. Industry,
Materials and Utilities, https://www.reuters.com/article/china-africa-idUSL3N1VO018.
13
Tom Ogwang and Frank Vanclay, “Resource-Financed Infrastructure: Thoughts on Four Chinese-Financed
Projects in Uganda,” Sustainability 13, no. 6 (March 16, 2021): 3259, https://doi.org/10.3390/su13063259.
14
Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping Diplomacy: Easier Said
than Done,” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 123 (May 3, 2020): 319–35,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645483.
15
To clarify, these authors have positively contributed to literature on the BRI. More than that, they are some of the
few who have mentioned vanity projects in their published work.
12
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were at times connected to Chinese companies.16 A 2019 analysis of democracy and development
by Roessler alluded to the phenomenon, writing that these projects “include the use of public
resources for private purposes (e.g., palaces, Swiss bank accounts, vanity projects).”17
Despite the lack of literature analyzing vanity projects, there seems to be a consensus that
these are so-called development projects that do not aid the country’s development needs.18 The
term appears to be popularized, to the extent a term barely present in literature can be popularized,
following Xi Jinping’s September 2018 speech where he utilizes the term. 19
While the purpose of vanity projects has not been well studied, scholars have extensively
explored Chinese motivations for the Belt and Road Initiative and the categories of projects it
funds. Some explanations focus on public diplomacy, or soft power, efforts to bolster perceptions
of China abroad.20 Others focus on connecting Chinese aid to conceptions of state legitimacy, or
public perceptions of a government’s legitimacy to rule.21 Some analysis focuses on specific

Douglas Murphy, “Castles Made of Sand: How London Lost on Boris Johnson’s Extravagant Pet Projects,” World
Policy Journal 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 3–8, https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-7085544.
17
Martin Roessler, “Political Regimes and Publicly Provided Goods: Why Democracy Needs Development,” Public
Choice 180, no. 3–4 (September 2019): 301–31, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00638-y.
18 I first found this term, explicitly defined in this way, in a 2014 World Bank study. See: Håvard Halland et al.,
“Resource Financed Infrastructure: A Discussion on a New Form of Infrastructure Financing” (World Bank Group,
2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0239-3.
19
Reuters, “China’s Xi Says Funds for Africa Not for ‘Vanity Projects.’”
20
Samantha Custer et al., “Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s Public Diplomacy and Its ‘Good Neighbor’ Effect”
(Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, June 2018).
Samantha Custer et al., “Silk Road Diplomacy” (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, December 2019),
https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Silk_Road_Diplomacy_Report.pdf.
Robert A Blair, Robert Marty, and Phillip Roessler, “Foreign Aid and Soft Power,” Working Paper (AidData at
William & Mary, August 2019),
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS86_Foreign_Aid_and_Soft_Power__Great_Power_Competition_in_Africa_in_
the_Early_21st_Century.pdf.
21
Robert A Blair and Phillip Roessler, “The Effects of Chinese Aid on State Legitimacy in Africa: Cross-National
and Sub-National Evidence from Surveys, Survey Experiments, and Behavioral Games,” Working Paper
(Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, July 2018),
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS59_The_Effects_of_Chinese_Aid_on_State_Legitmacy_in_Africa.pdf.
16
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sectors of Chinese aid, like health. 22 Others on transportation and railways. 23 Sometimes Chinese
finance is similar to multilateral Western finance, other times it seems predatory, inspiring the
widely debated idea of “debt-trap diplomacy.”24 Thus, scholars of the BRI point to Beijing’s desire
to achieve geostrategic goals (e.g. increase China’s global influence), economic development of
the recipient state, public and elite perceptions of China, and grow China’s trade network. That
said, there is little scholarly consensus regarding the motivations behind China’s Belt and Road
Initiative—but many are worried.25

3. Theory
This thesis conceptualizes vanity projects as those that do not have a specific economic or
welfare purpose. The following methodology section will operationalize vanity projects by clearly
explaining my data collection steps.

Karen A. Grépin et al., “China’s Role as a Global Health Donor in Africa: What Can We Learn from Studying
under Reported Resource Flows?,” Globalization and Health 10, no. 1 (December 30, 2014): 84,
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-014-0084-6.
Andreas Fuchs et al., “Mask Wars: China’s Exports of Medical Goods in Times of COVID-19,” SSRN Electronic
Journal; AidData Working Paper 108, June 2021, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3661798.
23
Jessica Dicarlo, “Grounding Development Finance and Safeguards through Land Compensation on the LaosChina Belt and Road Corridor,” GCI Working Paper (Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center
Global China Initiative, n.d.), https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2021/01/GCI_WP_013_Jessica_DiCarlo.pdf.
Yunnan Chen, “The Political Economy of Railway Development in Ethiopia’s Railway Sector and Implications for
Technology Transfer,” GCI Working Paper (Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center Global China
Initiative, January 2021), https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2021/01/GCI_WP_014_Yunnan_Chen.pdf.
24
Alysha Gardner et al., “Bargaining with Beijing: A Tale of Two Borrowers” (AidData at William & Mary, Center
for Global Development, February 2021), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/bargaining-beijing-tale-twoborrowers-revised-feb2021.pdf.
Kai Gehring, Lennart C. Kaplan, and Melvin H.L. Wong, “China and the World Bank - How Contrasting
Development Approaches Affect the Stability of African States,” SSRN Electronic Journal, AidData at William &
Mary, September 2019, 120, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467991.
25
Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati et al., “Building Bridges or Breaking Bonds? The Belt and Road Initiative and
Foreign Aid Competition,” SSRN Electronic Journal, AidData at William & Mary, April 2019, 50,
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3329502.
22
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3a. Conceptualization of Vanity Projects
A Chinese financed vanity project is a project which does not aid the country’s
development needs. A vanity project is not a Chinese-funded economic project which seeks to
expand a region’s economy. For instance, a hotel falls under this designation as it improves the
tourism sector; a railroad facilitates the movement of goods, services, and people, thus expanding
an economy; and a hydropower dam provides clean energy which can be exported or utilized
internally by a state. Nor is a vanity project a welfare project which is conceptualized as one that
seeks to improve human development, such as meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). Thus, constructing a school is a welfare project because quality education is an SDG.
While not necessarily pursing an economic or welfare purpose, Chinese language or cultural
projects are also not vanity projects. These projects have a strict public diplomacy agenda and aim
to spread soft power. These projects are well-studied and have a clear geostrategic purpose.

3b. Hypotheses
Based on my conceptualization of vanity projects, I crafted fourteen hypotheses displayed
in Table 1.26 These fourteen hypotheses consider a range of factors thought to be influential in
international development: regime type, state stability, civil and political freedoms, political

26

Based on data availability, some of the hypotheses were edited. For instance, hypothesis thirteen was originally
centered around public sentiment towards China. There is no open-source data available on this topic for each year
between 2000 and 2017, so the hypothesis was edited to instances of protests in a state. This is not a perfect proxy for
public sentiment and further research about Chinese financed vanity projects should consider including a better proxy.
One way to study this could be a sentiment analysis of media sources in the region where a vanity project is located.
Further, there was an additional hypothesis regarding elite sentiment of China. Similar to public sentiment,
there is no data publicly available for each year between 2000 and 2017. There is no specific proxy variable for elite
sentiment. Instead, there are multiple variables that involve elites. Variable three, instances of state failure, and
variable five, instances of federal elections, both involve political elites and the changing power structure within a
state. At the sub-national level, there is an analysis of the political implications of project locations, specifically
whether projects are located in a country’s political capital and/or in the head of state’s home region. Further analysis
on this topic should include accurate data on elite sentiment of China.

12
cooperation, voluntary and adverse regime changes, civil and violent unrest, international
competition for spheres of influence, economic changes, public and elite sentiment, and general
Chinese development financing. The hypotheses were developed to reflect and integrate each of
these factors. I wanted to make sure when searching for an explanation behind vanity projects, I
did not leave one of the major factors out of my analysis.

13

Table 1: Hypotheses about the impact of selected independent variables.

14

4. Methodology
In September 2021, William & Mary’s AidData research team released the most
comprehensive open-source data set on Chinese development financing available publicly.27 The
data set, covering 2000 to 2017, records over 13,000 Chinese development financing projects
worth 843 billion USD in 145 countries. AidData explains the motivation behind its research as a
response to “China and other so-called ‘emerging’ donors and creditors [fundamentally changing]
the international development finance landscape; however, many of these actors do not participate
in existing global reporting systems.”28
The Tracking Underreported Financial Flows methodology, first developed by AidData in
April 2013, is a technique to identify aid and credit allocations by states who do not openly publish
these financial and material disbursements. 29 To accomplish this, researchers parse information
published by governments, intergovernmental organizations, companies, nongovernmental
organizations, journalists, and research institutions. When available, the methodology favors data
from official sources.

4a. Data on Vanity Projects
My classification of vanity projects is based on data from the AidData data set. This
decision was made due to the wide breadth of the data set, its open-source nature, and academic

Ammar A Malik et al., “Banking on the Belt and Road” (AidData at William & Mary, September 2021),
https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Banking_on_the_Belt_and_Road__Insights_from_a_new_global_dataset_of_1342
7_Chinese_development_projects.pdf.
28
Samantha Custer et al., “Tracking Chinese Development Finance: An Application of AidData’s TUFF 2.0
Methodology” (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, 2021),
https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/AidData_TUFF_methodology_2_0.pdf.
29
“AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0,” AidData, 2021,
https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-finance-dataset-version-2-0.
27
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credibility. To curate my final data set I created five-step inclusion criteria to evaluate each Chinese
development financing project. As an additional check on the quality of the data set, I chose ten
data points I knew were vanity projects and ensured that my selection criteria captured all these
projects.30 Figure 1 below outlines my inclusion criteria to identify projects that do (and do not)
represent vanity projects.

30

Original iterations of the inclusion criteria excluded key projects. For instance, in one iteration the criteria excluded
projects coded as “Official Development Aid” because I believed the category to indicate an alignment with
international development initiatives, including the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. This assumption
was wrong, and the tracking of key data points highlighted this error. Further, my thesis analyzes projects
geographically and temporally. If a data point does not have this data, it cannot be analyzed in my thesis.

16

Figure 1: Decision tree of inclusion criteria
The AidData data set includes a field called “Recommend for Aggregates.” The
accompanying codebook describes this field as:

17
This field identifies projects that AidData recommends including in analysis that requires
the aggregation of projects supported by official financial (or in-kind) commitments from
China, including analysis of monetary amounts and project counts. It is useful for
identifying formally approved, active, and completed Chinese government-financed
projects – and excluding all cancelled projects, suspended projects, and projects that never
reached the formal approval (official commitment) stage. The field is set to ‘Yes’ for all
projects with a status designation of Pipeline: Commitment, Implementation, and
Completion that have not also been designated as umbrella agreements. It is set to ‘No’ for
all cancelled projects, suspended projects, and projects that never reached the official
commitment stage (i.e. those projects with a status designation of Pipeline: Pledge,
Suspended, and Cancelled). Additionally, to avoid double-counting, the field is set to ‘No’
for all umbrella agreements.31
Following the codebook’s recommendation, the first inclusion criterion rejects projects
which are marked “No” in the “Recommended for Aggregates” column. This thesis does aggregate
projects and thus, projects which are canceled, never formally approved, or umbrella (i.e., has sub
projects which are also recorded in the data set) are irrelevant.
To analyze the causes of vanity projects, a confirmed date is required to be associated with
each project. Every AidData project has a “Commitment Year” identified. This is defined by the
codebook as “[capturing] the year in which an official financial commitment (or official
commitment to provide in-kind support) was codified through the signing of a formal
agreement.”32 However, some of these commitment years are estimated based on other known
facts about the project. Estimated years are indicated by a “Yes” response in the “Commitment
Year Estimated” column.
Temporal analysis for this thesis relies on the “Commitment Year” field as opposed to
other temporally related fields because this column has the most complete data. For instance, the
“Implementation Start Year” identifies when a project begins but is often left blank. Further, the
“Commitment Year” field is more relevant as many of my hypotheses deal with interactions

31
32

“AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0.”
“AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0.”
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between China and a recipient nation that prompt the initiation of a vanity project. Thus, this
inclusion criterion accepted projects marked as “No” in the “Commitment Year Estimated” field.
This thesis involves geospatial analysis at the sub-national level and thus requires data to
have a known geographic location associated with it. Most of these locations are precise, but some
of the locations are only identified at the first administrative level (ADM1), or the first federally
acknowledged boundary.33 Geographically locatable projects are noted in the AidData data set by
having an entry in the “Geographic Location” column. Projects which are not geographically
locatable include projects generically donated to a country, for instance, food aid given to the
country at large.
Every AidData project is associated with “a sector name based upon the primary sectoral
focus of the project.”34 These 24 sectors are from the OECD’s sector categorization scheme.35
Table 2 below shows the OECD sectors that potentially contain vanity projects and Table 3 shows
the OECD sectors which do not contain vanity projects and why. Sectors deemed not pertinent
were blanket rejected.

33

geoBoundaries, a global repository of boundary data based out of William & Mary, explains the different
administrative division (ADM) levels. ADM0 represent the country’s international boundary. ADM1 is the first
order administrative unit, usually state or province boundaries. ADM2 is the second order administrative unit,
usually municipality boundaries. This classification continues until the smallest geographical unit of administration.
geoBoundaries, “Comprehensive Global Administrative Zones (CGAZ),” William & Mary geoLab, accessed April
26, 2022, https://www.geoboundaries.org/downloadCGAZ.html.
34
“AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0.”.
35
“Purpose Codes: Sector Classification,” OECD, accessed January 26, 2022,
https://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-financestandards/purposecodessectorclassification.htm.

19

Table 2: Table of sector codes that do potentially include vanity projects 36

36

United Nations, “THE 17 GOALS | Sustainable Development,” accessed April 26, 2022, https://sdgs.un.org/goals.

20

Table 3: Table of sector codes that do not potentially contain vanity projects 37
37

United Nations, “THE 17 GOALS | Sustainable Development.”

21

The remaining 882 projects were manually coded into six sub-sectors codes. Some projects
fit into two categories and were placed into the one that best fit its activity. To ensure the accuracy
of the coding, the data set was reviewed multiple times to ensure all vanity projects were captured.
All projects not identified as the vanity project sub-sector were rejected from the data set.

Table 4: Table of manually coded sub-sector codes 38

This thesis treats each geographic location of a project independently, in contrast to
AidData, which focuses on independent financial flows above other factors. In the first geographic
manipulation of the data, I manually identified nine projects which represented more than one

38

United Nations, “THE 17 GOALS | Sustainable Development.”
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geographic location. I then split each project up so that every data point in my thesis represents a
unique geographic location. These 9 projects become 35 projects each with a unique location.
Next, since AidData’s projects are sorted based on financial flows, some projects are under
different data points because two different types of financial flows go to the same project. Each
project in my data set must represent a unique purpose, therefore, multiple points representing the
same event would disrupt this analysis. I identified 84 projects in the data set as matching other
projects or having the same exact purpose as other projects. These 84 projects were condensed to
35 projects.
149 projects required no geographic manipulation, leaving 219 projects in the final data
set. Each of these projects has a unique geographic location and purpose.

Figure 2: Diagram of geographic manipulation steps
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Finally, for each of the 219 projects I identified the precise project location when possible,
and the ADM1 and ADM2 levels of the project. 39 This extra data builds upon the original AidData
geographical data. This geographic precision allows for sub-national analysis of vanity projects.

4b. Mixed-Methods Approach
To understand the vanity project phenomenon this thesis utilizes a mixed methods
approach, combining quantitative, qualitative, and geospatial analysis. This approach allows for a
large-N cross-national analysis of the vanity project data set and a sub-national analysis focusing
on specific projects. This mixed methods approach is important as it studies potential reasons from
different angles with different methodology.
Part one of the data analysis section explores the vanity project data set. This exploration
maps aspects of the data spatially and graphically, often in comparison to the original data set.
This first analysis section allowed me to comprehend the data and influenced decisions made later
in the data analysis.
Secondly, I did a quantitative large-N analysis of the fourteen variables conceptualized in
the proceeding theory section. The exact data utilized in this analysis is explained in the variable
construction portion of this methodology, but the unit of analysis is each year in a state. To analyze
these variables, I ran regressions in R to investigate statistical significance and the direction of
correlation. I used the Poisson event count model for my regressions since my dependent variable
is a count of vanity projects. I additionally ran an OLS regression as a robustness check.
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Running the model for all 145 states allowed me to make sure a condition did not come out
as significant when the same condition was present in a state with no vanity projects. For the 86
of these states without vanity projects, the dependent variable was 0 for each year. This method
gave me a maximum of 2,610 data points for each variable, or 18 years for all 145 countries. 40
Thirdly, to complement my cross-national results, I conducted a sub-national geospatial
analysis. This analysis focuses on understanding where vanity projects occur in a state. 41 In this
section I wanted to better understand the potential interactions with public and elite sentiments
because those variables were not precisely covered by the large-N analysis due to data availability.
This objective is accomplished in this analysis by understanding where projects occur in relation
to population and political centers. Finally, I conducted case studies to see if the conditions flagged
as significant by my cross-national statistics models were present in a state.

4c. Variable Construction
The dependent variable is the count of vanity projects per year in a state. The dependent
variable was modified once by leading it, with the goal of understanding potential temporal
relationships between dependent and independent variables. The reason for doing this is it ensure
the independent variables occurs before the dependent variable, as opposed to concurrently or
after.
Independent variables one through four, which measure regime type and stability, use data
from the Polity5 Project. The Polity5 data set “examines concomitant qualities of democratic and
autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of
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In reality, every regression ran with a smaller N due to missing data and South Sudan not being founded until
2011.
41
This analysis was possible because of the geographic manipulation I conducted when constructing the data set and
discussed earlier in the methodology.
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governance.”42 This approach allows Polity5 to study a wide range of regimes, from the fully
institutionalized to the transitional, mixed regimes. To measure regime type for variable one, I use
Polity5’s primary data set.43 The methodology scores countries from -10 to 10, with lower numbers
being the least democratic. To ease interpretation of my regression results, I recoded the data to
range from 1 to 21, with lower numbers still being the least democratic. For example, North Korea
was scored a 1 and Cabo Verde a 21 in 2001.
To measure state fragility, I use Polity5’s State Fragility Index and Matrix. 44 Each country
is annually scored from 0 to 25, with 25 being the most fragile state. In the data set, Somalia is
scored as a 25 in 2008 and Mauritius as a 0 in 2017. To measure instances of state failure, variable
three, I use Polity5’s PITF State Failure Problem Set and the Coups d’État data.45 Variable three
counts the number of state failures, or attempted state failures, in each country each year. Events
identified by Polity5 include successful coups, attempted coups, ousting of the head of state by
foreign forces, and assassination of executives, among other things. Finally, the measure of levels
of political violence, variable four, is from Polity5’s Major Episodes of Political Violence. 46 The
data separates violence into six categories, then rates the magnitude of violence in that category
from one, no violence, to ten, severe violence. The categories are episode(s) of international
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violence, international warfare, civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic warfare
involving that state in that year. My measure is the sum of these six categories.
To measure occurrences of federal elections, variable five, I used data from IPU Parline. 47
This data was supplemented by information from states’ government websites. IPU Parline obtains
its data directly from a state’s national government. In my thesis, the values represent the number
of federal elections occurring in the state that year. I defined federal elections as lower house,
upper house, and head of state elections. For instance, the Maldives has a value of one in 2005
because the Maldives parliamentary election, called the People’s Majilis, occurred, but no other
elections did.
Independent variable six is level of political rights by Freedom House. 48 Values for each
country in a year are on a 7-point scale, with 7 being the least free. To standardize my data, I
recoded both variable six and seven making one the least free, thus reversing the scale. This allows
the higher values to indicate that more freedoms are present. For instance, Guinea is scored as a 1
in 2008 and Saint Lucia as a 7 in 2000. Freedom House’s overall rights score is a combination of
the political rights and civil liberties scores. I separated these dimensions into two variables to
isolate political freedoms from civil ones. A society’s ability to elect a government is different
from, for instance, press freedoms. The political rights category considers measures of the electoral
process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government.
To study the level of civil liberties in a state each year, or how free a civil society is, for
variable seven, I utilize Freedom House’s civil liberties score. 49 The civil liberties score is a
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measure of four categories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Similar to the political rights data
after my recoding, countries are assigned a value between one and seven, with one being the least
free. In this data set, Costa Rica is ranked as a 7 in 2003 and Myanmar a 1 in 2000.
To measure agreement with the United States at the UN General Assembly I used data
published by the researchers Michael Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten on Harvard
Dataverse.50 The original data set assesses how each state has voted on roll call votes at the General
Assembly since its founding. I use the focused data on how often a country agrees with another
country. Agreement is defined as voting the same way on a vote, it does not necessarily mean the
two states are working together. First, I looked at how often states votes with the United States.
The values range from 0 to 1, with 0 being no agreeing votes with the United States and 1 being
complete agreement with the United States on votes. For instance, the Marshall Islands voted with
the United States 94% of the time in 2002 in contrast to Turkmenistan who voted with the United
States 9.8% of the time in 2007. For variable nine, I used the same data to look at agreement with
China at the UN General Assembly. Again, the values range from 0 to 1, with 0 being no agreeing
votes with the China and 1 being complete agreement with the China on votes. As am example,
Nauru voted with China 14% of the time in 2011 and Nepal voted with China 93% of the time in
2001.
For variable ten I investigated the total number of Chinese development financing projects
in a country in a year using the AidData data set. 51 This is the same data set my dependent variable,
vanity projects, is from. However, the vanity projects data set cultivated for this thesis included
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geographical and time manipulation, as detailed earlier in the methodology. This independent
variable did not include the same variation. Further research should apply the variation to both
data sets equally to better conceptualize the breadth of Chinese development financing.
My Gross Domestic Product data, variable eleven, is from the World Bank and
standardized in constant 2015 USD.52 Actualized rates of change were generated from this with a
one-year lag. For instance, the data point for Afghanistan in year 2000 is Afghanistan's 2000 GDP
minus Afghanistan's 1999 GDP. Similarly, for GDP per capita, variable twelve, I also used World
Bank data, which was standardized in constant 2015 USD.53 GDP per capita gives a more accurate
economic measurement based on a population. Once again, I manipulated the data to consider
change from the previous year.
To measure protests, my proxy variable for public sentiment (variable thirteen), uses data
from the Mass Mobilization Project, accessed through Harvard Dataverse.54 The data set
aggregates the number of protests in a country per year, conceptualizing a protest as an event
involving 50 or more people publicly demonstrating against the government. For instance, there
were 21 protests in Tunisia in 2011, many of which were part of the 2011 Arab Spring.
For variable fourteen, US development financing, I obtained data from USAID and the US
Department of State’s data repository on foreignassistance.gov. 55 The “Country Summary” data
displays US development financing by country per year. I looked at the disbursement values in
constant USD amount.
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5. Analysis
As discussed in the methodology, this analysis section is split into three parts to conduct a
holistic study of the potential variables influencing the occurrence of vanity projects in a given
year in a state.

5a. Exploratory Analysis
This data set features 219 unique vanity projects. To review, a vanity project is a project
which does not have a clear, internationally recognized development purpose, such as athletics and
the fine arts.
All 219 projects in the data set are directly or indirectly financed by the Chinese
government. The breakdown of the specific financiers is shown in Figure 3, which demonstrates
how many projects each agency financed, not the amount each agency provided in the financing.
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Figure 3: Distinct Chinese entities funding vanity projects, broken down by number of projects
and ordered alphabetically. When multiple funding agencies were involved in a project, they
were all listed. For this reason, there are 237 projects, instead of 219. The reason for this
decision was to accurately represent how much each agency participates in vanity projects.

Most vanity projects are funded by a few Chinese entities. Figure 4 groups Chinese funders
who nominally invested in a few projects together. Nominal investment applies to agencies who
invested in fewer than 100 projects, or less than 1% of the whole data set.
The result is striking. The China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) finances 37% of
vanity projects, despite funding only 14% of projects in the overall data set. AidData found that
MOFCOM, a Chinese central government agency, “issues loans on extremely generous terms—
with average concessionality rates (i.e., grant elements) that approach 75%.”56 MOFCOM tends
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to focus on projects which “generate diplomatic and geostrategic benefits rather than commercial
benefits.”57 The prevalence of MOFCOM funding in the vanity project data set supports this
statement as the definition of vanity projects excludes development projects with commercial
benefits. Similarly, Chinese embassy projects, or projects financed by embassies in recipient
countries, tend to focus on diplomatic and non-commercial projects.
While MOFCOM and Chinese Embassies together finance 46.83% of vanity projects, it is
important to note that unspecified or other Chinese entities together finance 44.32% of vanity
projects. This latter number indicates the likelihood of many smaller Chinese entities contributing
to the existence of vanity projects. Most endeavors in China are top down, or perceived to be such,
but the wide breadth of agencies suggests that vanity projects are not necessarily a unified strategy
adopted by the Chinese Community Party. But this is a slim possibility due to the expansive and
controlling role of the Chinese Communist Party.
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Figure 4: Distinct Chinese entities funding projects, by percent. Funding agencies who invested
in less than 100 projects, or less than 1% of the entire sample, are grouped in the “Other Chinese
Funder” category. Please note, the vanity project data has undergone geographic manipulation
explained in the methodology, whereas the whole data set has not undergone this manipulation.

The AidData finding of MOFCOM primarily issuing grants, or loans with high
concessionality that are categorized as grants, is supported by a flow type analysis of the identified
vanity projects. As shown in Figure 5, 76.7% of vanity projects funded by grants, compared with
only 55% of all projects. This statistic indicates that for most vanity projects, recipient nations do
not incur a large financial expense. On initial glance, these descriptive financial statistics support
my hypothesis that vanity projects are gifts given to recipient nations, potentially for diplomatic
reasons.
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Figure 5: Flow types of projects, by percent. When multiple flow types were involved in a project,
the larger flow type was listed. The reason for this decision was to best represent the predominant
flow type for projects. Please note, the vanity project data has undergone geographic
manipulation explained in the methodology, whereas the whole data set has not undergone this
manipulation.

Looking more closely at the projects themselves, Figure 6 shows that 89% of vanity
projects are known to be completed. In contrast, only 44% of all projects in the data set have been
completed; there are proportionately more projects in the pre-completion phases (i.e.,
implementation, pipeline: commitment stages, and pipeline: pledge phase). Although this statistic
does not tell the full story, as it does not reveal whether projects were finished on time, it reveals.
that China is committed to completing vanity projects.
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Figure 6: Status distribution of projects, by percent. Please note, the vanity project data has
undergone geographic manipulation explained in the methodology, whereas the whole data set
has not undergone this manipulation.

As explained in the methodology section, the vanity projects are separated into four
categories based on their purpose. Of these categories, as shown in Figure 7, there is a high
concentration, or 68% of projects, in the athletics category, which includes primarily sports
stadiums.
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Figure 7: Categorization of vanity projects, by count.

Notable projects in the athletics category include a 2009 loan by MOFCOM constructed
the National Stadium near Praia, the capital of Cabo Verde. The 15,000-seat stadium is equipped
with FIFA-certified synthetic grass, a running track, changing rooms, press and physiotherapy
rooms, medical and security offices, and a public broadcasting system. The stadium hosted its first
international soccer competition in 2014, and, as the national stadium of Cabo Verde, is expected
to be a cornerstone of the island’s sports program (Project ID 21687-56498). A 2011 grant by a
Chinese Embassy was used to construct the Children’s Square Playground in Sofia, the capital of
Bulgaria. At the unveiling ceremony, Chinese Ambassador Guo Yezhou stated that “young people
are the future and hope of the friendly relations between China and Bulgaria” (Project ID 66637).
A 2015 grant by MOFCOM was used for the Thuwunna National Indoor Sports Stadium
Renovation Project in Yangon, Myanmar. The project is still under construction but has employed
multiple Chinese entities including China’s Agency for International Economic Cooperation for
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project design and Shanghai Construction Group for construction (Project ID 64172). A 2017 grant
by MOFCOM was given for the for Multipurpose Sport Gymnasium Construction and Sports
Facilities Refurbishment Project in Apia, the capital of Samoa. The multi-faceted construction
project aims to construct the multi-Sport Center and renovate the Samoa Aquatic Centre, Apia
Park Main Stadium, Apia Park Gymnasium, and Apia Park Tennis Court. These five stadiums
were the primary venues when Samoa hosted the 2019 (XVI) Pacific Games. When Samoa won
the bid to host the games, the state quickly sent a proposal to the Chinese government for help
(Project ID 65361).

Figure 8: Satellite imagery annotation of Cabo Verde’s National Stadium. A quick satellite
imagery analysis presents a conundrum: the National Stadium is not in the capital’s center and is
not surrounded by any infrastructure. This seemingly odd location for a stadium was equally
barren when the stadium was planned in 2009. It is possible planners were hoping infrastructure
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would follow the stadium and the area would develop. However, this has not come to fruition since
the stadium’s completion in 2014.
The second largest category, composed of 36 projects, is recipient country’s culture,
language, or history. Some examples of projects in this category are a 2004 grant by MOFCOM
constructed Patuxai Park, which translates to Victory Gate Park, in the center of Laos’ capital
Vientiane. Patuxai was originally built under Laos’ constitutional monarchy to celebrate
independence from France, but it now represents communism’s victory in the country. The
Chinese funded park surrounds the central monument and is now a top tourism location in the city
(Project ID 33755).58 A 2006 grant by an unspecified Chinese Government Institution created
supporting infrastructure to increase accessibility to the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre in
Rwanda’s capital. The memorial is the country’s primary memorial to the 1994 Rwandan genocide
and is the final resting place for over 250,000 victims (Project ID 1885).59 A 2007 grant by an
unspecified Chinese Government Institution renovated the National Museum in Sultan Park, Malé,
the capital of the Maldives. The project, which opened to the public in 2010, serves as a platform
for preserving of and teaching about the cultural heritage of the Maldives. Currently, the museum
is ranked as one of the Maldives’ top tourist attractions (Project ID 34999).60 In 2017, an
unspecified Chinese Government Institution provided fireworks for Jamaica’s 55 th anniversary of
independence. These fireworks were the cornerstone of Jamaica’s two main celebrations: the
“Grand Gala” event at the National Stadium and the waterfront, both in the capital city of Kingston
(Project ID 70402).61
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Figure 9: Taken on May 23, 2019, at Patuxay park by the author, Caroline Morin. The sign
shows the victory arch built by China in 2004 (Project ID 33755). Behind where I am standing is
a sculpture of an elephant constructed out of china porcelain and a large TV showing ads about
BRI projects in Laos run by Silk Road Media, both of which make it very clear that the area was
funded by China. Prior to 2004, the arch stood alone in the middle of a busy Vientiane
intersection.

The fine arts vanity category includes 20 projects. Some examples are a 2001 grant by
MOFCOM modernized the Kyrgyz Opera and Ballet Theater in Bishkek, the capital of
Kyrgyzstan. The building is named after the Kyrgyzstan actor, composer, and opera singer
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Abdylas Maldybaev. The building now stands as a testament to the two states friendship and hosts
many events each month (Project ID 40297).62 A 2006 concessional loan by the Export-Import
Bank of China enabled the construction of the National Academies for the Performing Arts
(NAPA) in Port of Spain, the capital of Trinidad & Tobago. NAPA was part of the country’s
“Vision 2020” initiative to sustainably expand cultural initiatives in urban areas. NAPA was
officially handed over to the Trinidad and Tobago government in 2009 but has been full of
controversy. In 2014, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration closed NAPA for two
years due to severe safety issues, including shattered glass panes, issues with air quality, unsafe
roofs and ceilings, loose bolts, and more. China claims no sub-standard materials were used and
the building is a “masterpiece.” The international arts community has called NAPA “defective”
citing a wide variety of reasons (Project ID 40005-59994).63 A 2010 grant by MOFCOM
constructed an opera house in the suburbs of Algiers, the capital of Algeria. Information about the
opera house, which is Algeria’s first, all centers on China’s generosity and friendship with Algeria.
Notably, the project experienced multiple delays and did not open until 2016 (Project ID 523).64
A 2013 grant by MOFCOM constructed the Lebanese Higher Conservatory of Music in Dbaye,
Lebanon. The project will include a 1,200-seat concert hall, a teaching building, equipment rooms,
an underground garage, a reception hall, and more. Despite being agreed to in 2013, the project is
still being implemented (Project ID 65712-65714-40971-65786).65
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Figure 10: Satellite imagery annotation of the controversial NAPA, from 2005 and 2021.

Finally, the miscellaneous vanity category includes 16 projects. Some examples are a 2012
interest-free loan by MOFCOM to renovate the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan.
The Friendship Hall includes a conference building, banquet hall, exhibition hall, and theater
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(Project ID 30434).66 A 2014 grant by a Chinese Embassy constructed the Grand' Anse Praslin
Community Center in the Praslin, Seychelles. The community center serves as a primary gathering
space for the local community (Project ID 55582). A 2015 grant by MOFCOM was used to
renovate Los Diques Metropolitan Park in Cártago, Costa Rica. The project is still being
implemented but seeks to increase trails, biodiversity, children’s play areas, and more (Project ID
70440). A 2017 grant by the People's Government of Guangdong Province was allocated to
renovating the Suva Civic Center, located in the capital of Fiji. The center is the city’s premier
entertainment venue to rent for events ranging from wedding receptions to conferences, and
includes an auditorium, a dining hall, and more (Project ID 64288).67
The AidData data set includes official Chinese-financed projects from 2000 to 2017. Since
the BRI did not begin until September 2013, most projects in the data set occur prior to the BRI’s
commencement. The prevalence of projects prior to the BRI’s commencement, however, indicate
that the BRI, in terms of vanity projects, may be more of a continuation as opposed to a change in
action by the Chinese Community Party.
Figure 11 represents the commitment year for each vanity project. The graph shows a
general upward trend, as expressed by the exponential trendline. There is variability in the data,
including seemingly abrupt spikes and dips. Specifically, there is a large spike in the amount of
vanity projects committed to in 2006. 68
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Figure 11: Temporal Distribution of vanity projects, by count.

The variability of the timing of vanity projects and the 2006 spike is not visible in the whole
AidData data set. As shown in Figure 12, the data more closely hugs the exponential trendline.
The upward trend is especially pronounced following the 2013 declaration of the Belt and Road
Initiative. The difference in the variability of vanity projects in comparison to the whole data set
is something to be investigated further.
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Figure 12: Temporal Distribution of all projects in the AidData data set. This figure represents
10,081 projects in the AidData data set, or the projects which were both recommended for
research purposes and have a known, firm commitment year. This is the full project list after the
first two steps of the inclusion criteria, which was chosen due to the necessity of a confirmed year
for temporal analysis. Please note, the vanity project data has undergone geographic
manipulation explained in the methodology, whereas the whole data set has not undergone this
manipulation.

To further explore the temporal distribution of projects, I investigated when each state with
vanity projects completed two important diplomatic agreements with China: establishing
diplomatic relations and formally agreeing to join the BRI. Between 1949 and 2021, all countries
with vanity projects formally established diplomatic relations with China. There is no information
on when Curacao established diplomatic relations, however, there is a Chinese Consulate-General
located in the capital of Willemstad and the Netherlands, which handles all of Curacao’s foreign
relations, established diplomatic ties with China in 1954.69
“China and the Netherlands,” Embassy of People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Netherlands, 2016 2004,
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cenl/eng/zhgx/zzgx/t137589.htm.
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Four countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Myanmar—established diplomatic
relations with China in 1949, the year the People’s Republic of China was founded. 70 Six
countries—Costa Rica (2007), Dominica (2004), Grenada (2005), Malawi (2007), Nauru (2002),
and South Sudan (2011)—established diplomatic relations with China in the twenty-first century.
For all these states, China did not fund a vanity project until after diplomatic relations were
established.

Map 1: The year when states most recently established diplomatic relations with China. The data
is broken down in categories by the natural breaks (Jenks) classification generated by ESRI’s
ArcGIS Pro. Data credits for country boundaries go to geoBoundaries and year of establishing
diplomatic relations to AidData. 71
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The second significant date I chose to look at to explore the data is when states signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China to formally join the BRI. While most projects
in the data set occurred prior to 2013, due to the temporal coverage of the data set, the date of a
MoU being signed signifies growth in the diplomatic relationship between China and the recipient
nation. As shown in Map 2, there is a wide range of dates when states joined the BRI. Of the four
states that established diplomatic relations with China in 1949, only Mongolia signed on to the
BRI in 2013, the year it was established. Notably, not all states which have signed MoUs have
vanity projects.
Surprisingly, nine countries with vanity projects—Bahamas, Central African Republic,
Curacao, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Malawi, Mauritius, Nauru, and Saint Lucia—have not signed a
MoU with China to join the BRI as of March 2022. Of these nine, Curacao’s foreign relations are
controlled by the Netherlands which has also not signed a MoU on the BRI, and Malawi and Nauru
established diplomatic relations with China after 2000. Five of these states—Bahamas, Central
African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Nauru, and Sanit Lucia—do not have any vanity projects after
the inauguration of the BRI in 2013. The remaining four states—Curacao, Jordan, Malawi, and
Mauritius—do have an official Chinese financed vanity project after 2013, indicating that formally
agreeing to the BRI is not a pre-requisite to receive a vanity project.
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Map 2: When states with vanity projects signed a MoU to join the BRI. Data credits for country
boundaries go to geoBoundaries and year of establishing diplomatic relations to AidData. 72

Regional exploration of the data shows a similar pattern between vanity projects and the
whole data set, with 50% of vanity projects and 47% of all projects located in Africa. It is important
to note that AidData’s six-region categorization encompasses vastly different areas in terms of
area, population, GDP, and other indicators. An even distribution of projects across regions does
not represent an even distribution of projects across the world. While only 11% of vanity projects
are located in Oceania, considering the small population and area of the region, this record
indicates a potentially higher number of projects per capita than other regions.

Malik et al., “Banking on the Belt and Road.”
Runfola et al., “GeoBoundaries.”
72
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Figure 13: Regional distribution of projects, by percent. Please note, the vanity project data has
undergone geographic manipulation explained in the methodology, whereas the whole data set
has not undergone this manipulation.

Figure 14 and Map 3 illustrate the geographic distribution of vanity projects by country.
Fifteen percent of projects, or 33 projects, are the only project in a country. Further, only twelve
countries have five or more vanity projects. To identify why China is participating in these vanity
projects, it may be fruitful to further investigate the states that have a higher concentration of
projects. The 33 countries with only one project could be explained by many factors, and it is
unlikely that enough evidence would be available to construct a singular theory. However, if a
condition is present both in states with high and low concentrations of vanity project leading to the
project occurring, that is strong evidence supporting the theory. As stated in the methodology, this

48
thesis employs a mixed methods approach to address these considerations by doing quantitative
cross-national analysis and a more qualitative sub-national analysis.

Figure 14: States with vanity projects.

Map 3: Geographical distribution of vanity projects. The data is broken down in categories by
natural breaks (Jenks) classification generated by ArcGIS Pro. Data credits for country
boundaries go to geoBoundaries. 73
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Runfola et al., “GeoBoundaries.”
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To conclude this initial analysis, I examined three demographic indicators for states with
vanity projects. These three indicators—governance, GDP, and population—together provide an
idea of the diversity of the states in the data set. Each indicator is geographically displayed for the
2010 value. 2010 was chosen due to its approximate middle location in the data set, which ranges
from 2000 to 2017, and for the availability of data.
Map 4 displays the freedom status of states, or whether a state is free, partly free, or not
free based on Freedom House’s categorization of political rights and civil liberties, as explained
in the methodology. There is a fairly even distribution across these three categories: 25 states are
ranked as free, 29 states as partly free, 22 states as not free, and there is no data for three states.

Map 4: Freedom categorization of countries with vanity projects, according to Freedom House’s
2010 data. Data credits for country boundaries go to geoBoundaries and freedom rankings are
from Freedom House.74

Runfola et al., “GeoBoundaries.”
Freedom House, “Freedom in the World.”
74
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The World Bank gross domestic product (GDP) data from 2010, represented in Map 5,
again illustrates the diversity of the data set as values range from 45 million USD (Nauru) to
232,654 million USD (Malaysia).

Map 5: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries with vanity projects in 2010, according to the
World Bank. The data is broken down in categories by natural breaks (Jenks) classification
generated by ArcGIS Pro. Data credits for country boundaries go to geoBoundaries and GDP
data is from the World Bank.75

The UN population data from 2010, represented in Map 6, shows the diversity of the data
set as values range from 0.01 million (Nauru) to 179.42 million (Pakistan).

Runfola et al., “GeoBoundaries.”
World Bank, “GDP (Constant 2015 US$).”
75
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Map 6: Population in 2010 of countries with vanity projects, data is from the United Nations. The
data is broken down in categories by natural breaks (Jenks) classification generated by ArcGIS
Pro. Data credits for country boundaries go to geoBoundaries and population data is from the
United Nations.76

These three demographic indicators emphasize the complexity of the empirical puzzle
studied in this thesis: what independent variable could explain the phenomenon of vanity projects
across 79 vastly different states?

5b. Cross-National Analysis of the Causes of Vanity Projects
For my cross-national analysis, I studied possible relationships between my fourteen
independent variables and the dependent variable, the presence of vanity projects in a state. While
correlation does not imply causation, a significant statistical result does imply the existence of a
relationship.77
Runfola et al., “GeoBoundaries.”
To begin my cross-national analysis, I loaded the data into the R program, and cleaned it to allow the models to
run. The largest changes I made were recoding variables one, six, and seven, as explained in the methodology, and
76
77
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Before running my regression models, I ran a Pearson correlation test to examine the
relationship between the independent variables. 78 Table 5 shows the results of the correlation. The
closer the correlation coefficient is to 1 or -1, the stronger the correlation. I chose to remove
variable six, political rights, from my regression models because it has a strong positive correlation
with variable seven, civil liberties. This means when a state was ranked a one for limited political
rights, they were also likely to be ranked a one for civil liberties. Both the political rights and civil
liberties data are from Freedom House, so the high correlation results are not surprising. Further,
variable six, political rights, has a significant correlation with variable one, Polity5 democracy
levels. Since both variables measure indicators of democracy it is not surprising that they are
correlated. Keeping variable six in the data set, meaning keeping collinearity in the independent
variables, violates an assumption of linear regression, hence the decision to remove it.

designating all variables as numeric objects. The supporting code is attached for replication purposes in the
appendix.
78
The common statistical model operates under the assumptions that the variables are normally distributed, which
the data is. See also Boston University School of Public Health, “Correlation in R,” January 6, 2016,
https://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/BS/R/R5_Correlation-Regression/R5_CorrelationRegression3.html.
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Table 5: Correlation coefficients for all variables. Strong correlations are shown in bold.
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After dropping variable six from the analysis, I ran the other thirteen variables through a
Poisson event count regression model. 79 This model best works when the dependent variable is a
count variable, which my dependent variable, the count of vanity projects in a country per year, is.
I ran the model two times, first with the dependent variable and next with the dependent leading.
I chose to run a multiple linear regression of all thirteen variables to evaluate the relationship
between variables, while controlling the other variables.80
Shown in Table 6, the model is an accurate measure of the data set because the deviance is
lower than N.81 The model shows the coefficient with the direction of the relationship between the
variables and the standard error in parentheses. A positive correlation indicates that as the
independent variable increases, or becomes more of the measured activities, the dependent
variable, the number of vanity projects, will increase as well. The p value, or statistical
significance, shows at what level of confidence I can reject the null hypothesis associated with the
variable, and thus conclude that the independent variable has an impact on the dependent.

79

Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata, 3rd ed.
(Stata Press, 2014),
https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzI3MTg4MTlfX0FO0?sid=949c902a-c31f-4d9abc61-ed5536b64a17@redis&vid=0&format=EK&lpid=navPoint-268&rid=0.
80
R. on Stats and R, “Multiple Linear Regression Made Simple | R-Bloggers,” October 4, 2021, https://www.rbloggers.com/2021/10/multiple-linear-regression-made-simple/.
81
Penn State Elberly College of Science, “15.4 - Poisson Regression | STAT 501,” PennState: Statistics Online
Courses, accessed April 26, 2022, https://online.stat.psu.edu/stat501/lesson/15/15.4.
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Table 6: Poisson Event Count regression results.

Before interpreting the results, I tested the robustness by running an ordinary least square
(OLS) regressions, the most common type of linear regression model. 82 Again, I ran it as a multiple
regression model. The results of the model are available in the Appendix. The model proved to be
a poor fit for the data (see R-squared in the Appendix) as the model accounts for near zero of the

Long and Freese assert that “Although the linear regression model has often been applied to count outcomes, these
estimates can be inconsistent or inefficient. In some cases, the linear regression model can provide reasonable
results; however, it is much safer to use models specifically designated for count outcomes.” This statement partially
influenced why I chose to use the Poisson model. Long and Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent
Variables Using Stata.
82
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variation in the dependent variable.83 This suggests that the Poisson model was a more appropriate
choice for my data.
Looking at the results in Table 6, significance level indicates the confidence with which I
can reject the null hypothesis. With 99.9% confidence, I find that the more Chinese development
financed projects there are in a state, the more likely a vanity project is to occur in this year or the
next. Conventional knowledge indicates that more Chinese development financed projects would
indicate a higher likelihood for Chinese financed vanity projects, especially considering the same
data source was used for both variables.
Based on my statistical analysis, the more fragile a state is, the more likely a vanity project
is to occur in this year or the following year. However, fragility is different than instances of state
failures, China is unlikely to invest in a vanity project in failed states. Further, in terms of the
domestic conditions of a recipient state, the more civil liberties in a state, the more likely a vanity
project is to occur. At the international level, the more a state votes with China at the UNGA, the
more likely a vanity project is to occur. Finally, the higher the positive change in GDP, the less
likely a vanity project is to occur.
In the Poisson model, the generated coefficient predicts whether more or less vanity
projects will occur, not the size of the impact of the correlation. Thus, a second calculation is
needed to find the marginal effect of the independent variable on the dependent. 84 In R, I
calculated the marginal effect of the Poisson model. 85 The results of the calculation are shown in

Penn State Elberly College of Science, “2.5 - The Coefficient of Determination, r-Squared | STAT 462,” accessed
April 26, 2022, https://online.stat.psu.edu/stat462/node/95/.
84
Long and Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata.
85
Alan Fernihough, “Marginal Effects for Generalized Linear Models: The Mfx Package for R,” n.d., 15.
83
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Table 7 and the code is included is in the appendix. When computing the marginal effects of the
variables, I held the other values at their mean. 86

Table 7: Marginal Effect of Poisson model.

At a 99% confidence level, I can reject the null hypothesis for variable eleven and conclude
that the higher the positive change in GDP, the less likely a vanity project is to occur the next year.
However, the variable is statistically significant, it’s the marginal effect on the dependent variable,
the occurrence of vanity projects, is minimal (-2e12). Thus, changes in GDP do not sizably impact
the occurrence of a vanity project.

86

Independent variable five, the occurrences of federal elections, was analyzed as a discrete change by the code.
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The other significant independent variables—two, three, seven, nine, and ten—have larger
marginal effects. While the largest effect is 0.286, for variable nine, this result is still significant.
The majority of my dependent variable, vanity projects, are 0 or 1s due to breadth of data and
relatively small number of vanity projects. Thus, a change in variable nine, voting with China at
the UN General Assembly, has a significant impact on the dependent variable, the occurrence of
vanity projects.
These statistical results emphasize the important of a recipient state’s political strength. A
fragile state with high civil liberties who votes with China at the UNGA, but has few or no cases
of state failure, seems most likely to receive vanity projects. These results could be improved
statistically if I investigated a) the interactions between independent variables and b) whether the
predictions in the Poisson model are visible in my case studies. These two things should be
included in further research. This thesis chose to focus on qualitative and geospatial analysis for
the sub-national investigation of vanity projects.

5c. Sub-National Analysis
Before diving into my case studies, I wanted to investigate the location of projects and,
specifically, whether any trends were visible. My cross-national statistics indicated that fragile
states, which are politically aligned with China, are more likely to receive vanity projects. Variable
nine’s marginal effect indicates the significance of agreeing with China at the UNGA, which leads
to the question: are more projects placed in politically strategic locations?
This level of analysis was possible because I expanded on AidData’s locational data in my
geographical manipulation, as previously explained in the methodology. For each project, I
determined, when possible, the administrative divisions where the project is located and whether
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it is in the political capital, the largest population center, and/or the head of state’s birthplace.
Notably, a limitation of this analysis is there is more data available in urban areas for most
development indicators. If data was completely available, or I was confident the AidData data
accounted for and remedied the lack information available in remote areas, this analysis would
more fruitful.
Fifty nine percent of my identified vanity projects are located in a country’s political
capital. In Europe and Oceania, the percentage is even higher. The concentration of vanity projects
in a political capital could indicate that vanity projects are targeted toward political elites, but there
is still a lot of variation across the data set as the data is not resoundingly only located in political
capitals. More in-depth analysis should be conducted to test whether a project’s geographic
location is tied towards influencing political elites.

Figure 15: Bar chart of whether projects are in a country’s political capital, separated by
region.
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In Figure 16, I examined whether vanity projects are in the most populous city in a state.
If few projects were in the primary population centers, this could indicate that the projects are more
for the political elites than the larger population. However, in most states the political capital is the
most populated place in the country. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the geographic
distribution is similar to that depicted in Figure 15.

Figure 16: Bar chart of whether projects are in a country’s population center, separated by
region.

Narrowing in on the potential geographical influence of political elites, I focused on
biographical information about the head of states. Dreher, et al. found that in Africa, political
leaders’ birth regions receive more Chinese aid, especially in years with competitive elections,
whereas there is no birth region bias in allocation of World Bank aid.87

Axel Dreher et al., “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,” Journal of Development
Economics 140 (September 2019): 44–71, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.04.003.
87
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To test whether this result was observable in Chinese financed vanity projects, I used the
2021 Political Leaders’ Affiliation Database assembled by Dreher, et al.88 The database contains
information on birthplaces and ethnicities of leaders from 177 countries starting in 1989. 89
Figure 17 and Figure 18 display whether a leader’s birthplace is in the same administrative
division as a vanity project. 90 The charts show no strong evidence of Dreher, et al.’s finding of
birth-region bias in Chinese finance. This result is surprising given that the Africa region is where
approximately 50% of vanity projects are located and was the focus of Dreher, et al.’s analysis.
This analysis could be further elaborated on by looking at the overlap between head of states’
ethnic homeland and the location of vanity projects.
If there was a concentration of vanity projects in the head of states’ birth regions, this would
strongly point to the relative importance and influence of federal level political factors. While
vanity projects may be gifts for international cooperation, this potential action of gratitude is not
consistently applied and largely directed at heads of state.

Axel Dreher, “The Political Leaders’ Affiliation Database (PLAD)” (Harvard Dataverse, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YUS575.
89 The administrative divisions listed are from GADM. I changed the names of administrative divisions to match
those of geoBoundaries for consistency in my data.
90
As a reminder, in the United States, for instance, ADM1 would be the state of Virginia and ADM2 would be
Fairfax County.
88
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Figure 17: Bar chart showing whether a vanity project is located in the head of state’s birthplace
at the first administrative division level, by region.

Figure 18: Bar chart showing whether a vanity project is located in the head of state’s birthplace
at the second administrative division level, by region.

Case Study: Chile
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The first case study is Chile, a highly democratic and stable state with high civil liberties,
some international cooperation with China, but few recorded Chinese development finance
projects and no vanity projects. As shown in Table 8, Chile has some of the indicators that lead to
the likelihood of a vanity project occurring, but not all.
This South American state has become increasingly democratic since its return to
democracy in 1990 after the ousting of the repressive dictator General Augusto Pinochet by the
voting populous.91 Chileans are not afraid to voice dissent and protests are common, but these
protests occur largely within legal limits and there are no records of political violence or state
failure in the studied time frame. Instead, civilians are welcomed to voice dissent both in public
and in the media. This history does not mean Chile is a perfect democracy, in 2017, Freedom
House reported corruption, police violence, environmental concerns, and land rights issues with
indigenous groups.92
The Chilean economy is characterized by a high level of foreign trade, specifically the
exportation of mined minerals, including copper, and a preference for trade liberalization. 93 These
policies have led to an average GDP growth rate of almost 5% per year. 94

“Chile,” in The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, April 18, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/chile/.
92
“Chile: Freedom in the World 2017 Country Report,” Freedom House, accessed April 26, 2022,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/chile/freedom-world/2017.
93
CIA World Factbook, “Chile,” April 18, 2022.
94
World Bank, “GDP (Constant 2015 US$).”
91
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Table 8: Information and Indicators about Chile.

Statistical analysis indicated that voting with China at the UN General Assembly had the
largest marginal effect on increasing the likelihood of a state having a vanity project. While Chile
on average voted with China 85% of the time, it still does not have any vanity projects. This pattern
could indicate the importance having multiple significant indicators present, such as a larger
number of Chinese development financing projects and high state fragility, which are not present
in this case.
Not captured in my statistical analysis is the fact that AidData has recorded fewer overall
projects in the Western Hemisphere, potentially indicating that the region is a smaller strategic
priority for China. If this were the case, there would be no vanity projects in the region, however,
as revealed by a later case study, Grenada, a stable, highly democratic state in the Caribbean has
multiple projects.
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Map 7: ADM1 level of Chile, there are no vanity projects in the country.

Case Study: Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a fragile, autocratic state. While the state
does politically support China internationally, the frequent regime changes and high levels of
unrest make it an unlikely candidate for vanity projects. Yet as represented in Map 8, the country
is saturated with Chinese financed soccer stadiums and other projects.
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Map 8: Vanity projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

For decades there has been heavy armed ethnic conflict across the country, some of the
conflict is led by unified rebel armies against the autocratic federal regime. 95 Most recently,
President Joseph Kabila refused to leave office in 2016 causing a further decline in democracy and
an increase in turbulence. 96 Socio-economically the country experiences food insecurity amplified

“Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set, Historical State Armed Conflicts and Regime
Crises, 1955-2018.”
96
“Democratic Republic of the Congo: Freedom in the World 2017 Country Report,” Freedom House, accessed
April 26, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/democratic-republic-congo/freedom-world/2017.
95
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by civil unrest, infectious disease outbreaks (notably, Ebola), high poverty rates, and more. 97 Its
economy is depending on mineral exports, most recently, cobalt.
While the DRC meets some of the indicators for vanity projects—high state fragility and
strong political cooperation with China—these factors should be negated by the widespread
violence and persistence of state failures. Thus, the presence of vanity projects is perplexing and
again seems to indicate that specific geostrategic motivations are driving this investment, which
cannot be observed at a cross-national level.

Table 9: Information and Indicators about DRC.

Case Study: Grenada
Similar to Chile, Grenada is a Western Hemisphere state with a strong, stable democracy,
many civil liberties and a record of international political cooperation with China. Unlike Chile,

“Congo, Democratic Republic of The,” in The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, April 18, 2022),
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/congo-democratic-republic-of-the/.
97
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Grenada has received a higher number of overall Chinese development financing projects, a high
proportion of which are vanity projects. The vanity projects are shown in Map 9.

Map 9: Vanity projects in Grenada.

Since Grenada established diplomatic relations with China in 2005, it has been steadily
receiving a few development projects each year, as represented in Table 10. The data does not
explain why this small island nation with minimal resources seems to be a higher geostrategic
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priority to China than Chile. However, Grenada is not an outlier as other Caribbean states have
received high numbers of vanity projects, including Jamaica. What quantitative analysis does not
reveal is that the indicators for maximum likelihood of a vanity project occurring are only part of
the story. Grenada and other Caribbean states that share characteristics with Chile may be more
likely to receive a vanity project because they are a higher geostrategic priority. Further analysis
of vanity projects should investigate whether China’s geostrategic ambitions are connected to the
disbursement of vanity projects.
Grenada has been a stable democratic state since its revolution was concluded with the
invasion of the United States in 1983, who sought to oust the revolutionary and Cuban-supported
government.98 Like many other Caribbean states, its economy is reliant on tourism.

Table 10: Information and Indicators about Grenada.

Case Study: Lao PDR (Laos)

“Grenada,” in The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, April 14, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/grenada/.
98
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The one-party communist Laos is a partly stable regime with limited freedoms, but a
history of international political support of China and the recipient of many Chinese development
finance projects. Laos’ geographic proximity, combined with its support of China and lack of
unrest, makes it a highly likely case for vanity projects. Thus, it is not surprising that the state has
five projects. Notably, as shown in Map 10, all projects are located in the political capital and
largest city in the state.

Map 10: Vanity projects in Laos.
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The communist Pathet Lao gained control of the government in 1975, and has been closely
aligned with its communist neighbors, Vietnam and China, since. 99 In the studied time frame, Laos
has been increasingly dependent on foreign investment and aid, primarily from its Communist
allies. This aid has helped decrease widespread poverty and increase the state’s economy.
However, the economy remains dependent on resource exportation.100
While there are estimated to be a million Lao refugees or migrants in Thailand alone, there
has been minimal new displacement because of violence since the commencement of communism
in 1975.101 Migration, instead, reflects the rejection of the autocratic regime and minimal economic
opportunities. Notably, there is no outward political opposition the Communist party and no
independent civil society, everything is heavily regulated and monitored by the state. 102
As a fragile state dependent on international support and closely aligned with China, the
presence of vanity projects confirms my hypothesis that vanity projects are given to states closely
aligned with or cementing ties with China.

“Laos | JFK Library,” accessed April 26, 2022, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/laos.
“Laos,” in The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, April 19, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/laos/.
101
CIA World Factbook, “Laos,” April 19, 2022.
102
“Laos: Freedom in the World 2017 Country Report,” Freedom House, accessed April 26, 2022,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/laos/freedom-world/2017.
99

100
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Table 11: Information and Indicators about Laos.

Case Study: Nigeria
Nigeria is a fragile semi-democratic African state with continued violence and cases of
state failure. Nigeria politically cooperates with China internationally and is the recipient of many
Chinese development financing projects. However, its status as a failed state, or one with the record
of many state failures, an indicator which statistically decreases the likelihood of a vanity project
occurring, appears to be the overwhelming contributor the zero vanity projects in the state.
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Map 11: ADM1 level of Nigeria, there are no vanity projects in the country.
Nigeria is the largest sub-Saharan economy and is expected by 2050 to be the world’s
fourth most populous country.103 In 1999, Nigeria transitioned to a civilian government and began
institutionalizing democracy. The democratic process has been plagued by a petroleum-dependent
economy, corruption, and ethnic and religious tensions.104 Federal elections continue to feature
intimidation, voting irregularities, and violence preventing hundreds of thousands from voting, but
notably this is the longest period of democracy since independence. 105
Starting in 2006, ethnic militias began systematic attacking oil infrastructure in the delta
region in response to the exploitation of resources.106 Since 2011, the Nigerian-based Boko Haram

“Nigeria,” in The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, April 19, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/nigeria/.
104
CIA World Factbook, “Nigeria,” April 19, 2022.
105
“Nigeria: Freedom in the World 2017 Country Report,” Freedom House, accessed April 26, 2022,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2017.
106
“Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set, Historical State Armed Conflicts and Regime
Crises, 1955-2018.”
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terrorist group advocating for Islamic law has increasingly gained power in the state’s northeast. 107
The political failures combined with violence has led to widespread poverty, large unemployment
numbers, and displaced populations. 108

Table 12: Information and Indicators about Nigeria.
A difference between Nigeria and a fragile state may be Nigeria’s federal government lacks
power in many regions of the country. The widespread violence continually halts social services,
notably girls’ education, and the oil economy. China may be less incentivized to give a vanity
project to the state due to this high level of uncertainty caused by the multitude of recorded state
failures. Alternatively, Chinese development finance may be more targeted to meet Nigeria’s more
pressing concerns. However, if this were the case, then the DRC would not feature so many vanity
projects.

“Boko Haram,” National Counterterrorism Center, accessed April 26, 2022,
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html.
108
CIA World Factbook, “Nigeria,” April 19, 2022.
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Case Study: Palau
The Pacific Island state of Palau has no Chinese financed vanity projects, or Chinese
development financed projects in general. More than that, as shown in Table 13, Palau does not
even recognize the People’s Republic of China, instead it has diplomatic ties with Taiwan. These
indicators do not confirm the absence of projects but may be the reason for their absence.

Table 13: Information and Indicators about Palau.

Since gaining independence in 1994, Palau has participated in and renewed a Compact of
Free Association (COFA) with the United States, through which Palau grants the US military
access to the country in return for financial assistance.109 Palauans’ per capita income is nearly
double that of the neighboring Micronesia most likely because of COFA. 110 Palau’s strong
allegiance to the United States is visible at the United Nations, where Palau votes with the United
“Palau,” in The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, April 19, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/palau/.
110
CIA World Factbook, “Palau.”
109
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States States 82% of the time, and with China only 39% of the time. Beyond its connection to the
US, Palau’s economy is tourism-dependent, and the state is at a high risk of being impacted by
climate change. The lack of Chinese financed vanity projects is expected given these
characteristics. However, the case of Palau is not the norm among Pacific islands as both Samoa
and Vanuatu have received a large number of vanity projects.

Map 12: ADM1 level of Palau, there are no vanity projects in the country.

6. Conclusion
Fragile, not failed, states with high political cooperation with China and strong civil
liberties are the most likely to receive vanity projects. However, as demonstrated by the case
studies, the factors that were significant in the large-N analysis are not necessarily the only
predictors of when a vanity project occurs.
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My findings are limited by the scope of my dependent variable. The AidData data is the
most expansive open-source data on Chinese financing, but even it does not encompass everything.
In the future when the data set is updated to incorporate more states, this analysis should be
repeated. Further research should also apply the geographical manipulation used in my vanity
project data set to the full AidData data to allow for more robust comparisons between the two
data sets.
Also, in future analysis of vanity projects, researchers should consider how best to measure
public and elite sentiment towards China for each year in the selected time frame. A better
measurement of these indicators could provide further insight on the political motivations for
vanity projects. For instance, if there is data that the public does not support Chinese development
financing projects, that would indicate vanity projects are primarily driven by political elites.
To increase the robustness of my statistical analysis further research should test whether
predicted marginal effects are visible in the selected case studies. If these results are not visible,
the case studies should be expanded on to comprehend this difference. One reason for this
difference, which should be included in the regression analysis, is interactions between the
independent variables that impact how the independent variables interact with the dependent
variable.
To conclude, through my analysis of Chinese financed vanity projects, China uses the
projects as a reward for states supporting China in the international system. Further, China uses
the projects as gifts to influence fragile states and ensure that the international political cooperation
with China continues. In 2018, Xi Jinping may have proclaimed that the Belt and Road Initiative
features no vanity projects, but I hypothesize that China is continuing to engage in the
disbursement of vanity projects to its allies.
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Appendix
For replication purposes, the below figures show the R code used in the cross-national analysis,
included for replication purposes:

Appendix Figure 1: Reading the data and cleaning it in R to prepare it for analysis.
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Appendix Figure 2: Recoding variables one, six, and seven, this standardized the data so that the
higher values meant more of the measure and got rid of negative values.

Appendix Figure 3: Pearson method of correlation used to see interactions between variables.

Appendix Figure 4: Code for Poisson model, ran a second time to lead the data.

Appendix Figure 5: Code for OLS model, used as a robustness check.

Appendix Figure 6: Code for Poisson Marginal Effects, ran a second time to lead the data.
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Appendix Figure 7: Results of OLS regression used for robustness check.

